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Essay 
Constitutional Chronometry, Legal Continuity, 
Stability and the Rule of Law: A Canadian Perspective 
on Aspects of Richard Kay’s Scholarship 
WARREN J. NEWMAN 
The United States and Canada have many common traits, including a 
constitutional heritage originally derived in part from British common law and 
statute, a written constitution declared to be supreme law, a federal and local state 
(or provincial) division of legislative powers, an entrenched bill of rights, written 
procedures for constitutional amendment, and constitutional judicial review. 
However, while the United States has a presidential and congressional system of 
government, Canada is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system of 
responsible government. Moreover, unlike the United States, Canada achieved its 
independence from the United Kingdom gradually and incrementally, within the 
existing legal and constitutional framework. The corollary to this evolution is that 
there is no predominant revolutionary tradition or discourse in Canadian 
constitutional discourse or jurisprudence. Canadian legal and political culture 
places great value on the maintenance of legal continuity and stability, and in 
adhering to prescribed forms and processes of law-making. 
Professor Richard Kay’s scholarship has long explored the nature and 
essence of American constitutionalism and the importance, in that tradition, of its 
commitment to a written document. And in his master work, The Glorious 
Revolution and the Continuity of Law, he examined the fraught and tenuous 
relationship between law and revolution. The following essay examines Professor 
Kay’s article, “Constitutional Chronometry,” and tests some of the ideas and 
assumptions therein, notably from a Canadian perspective. The essay concludes 
that revolutionary breaks with existing constitutional and legal orders are not the 
inevitable outcomes of anachronistic constitutions, however much revolutionaries 
may attempt to justify their actions ex post facto in that light. If revolutions do 
occur and liberal constitutions are overthrown, it will not be because the 
constitutions themselves are out of date, but because the commitment to 
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Constitutional Chronometry, Legal Continuity, 
Stability and the Rule of Law: A Canadian Perspective 
on Aspects of Richard Kay’s Scholarship 
WARREN J. NEWMAN * 
PREFATORY REMARKS 
I was honored and delighted to have taken part in the symposium at the 
University of Connecticut dedicated to the constitutional ideas of Professor 
Richard Kay. It has been a signal privilege and pleasure to know Rick Kay 
and his work for more than twenty years, in both my professional capacity 
as a constitutional lawyer with the Department of Justice of Canada, and in 
my academic capacity as a part-time professor at several Canadian law 
schools. Professor Kay’s careful and profound scholarship, and his elegant 
and precise writing style, have been a constant and ready source of 
inspiration. My students in comparative constitutional law have 
particularly benefitted, over the years, from his masterful chapter on 
American constitutionalism in Larry Alexander’s excellent collection on 
the philosophical foundations of constitutionalism, published by 
Cambridge University Press.1 
Much of my own work and academic pursuits over the past forty years 
have involved existential questions relating to constitutionalism and the 
rule of law, legal stability and continuity, and constitutional change. In 
1985 in the Manitoba Language Rights Reference, the Supreme Court of 
Canada struck down as invalid 90 years of laws enacted by the Legislature 
of the Canadian province of Manitoba, for want of compliance with a 
constitutional manner-and-form requirement going to the enactment of 
legislation.2 In the Quebec Secession Reference in 1998, the Supreme 
Court had to determine whether the law of the Constitution of Canada 
                                                                                                                     
* B.A., B.C.L., LL.B. (McGill), LL.M. (Osgoode), Ph.D. (Queen’s), Ad. E.; Senior General 
Counsel, Constitutional, Administrative and International Law Section, Department of Justice of 
Canada.  This Paper is offered purely in this author’s academic capacity and the views expressed herein 
do not bind the Department or the Government of Canada. 
1 Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS 16–50 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998). 
2 Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, 746 (Can.). On the reference 
mechanism in Canada, see Warren J. Newman, Standing to Raise Constitutional Issues in Canada, in 
STANDING TO RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 203–07 (Richard S. Kay 
ed., 2005); CARISSIMA MATHEN, COURTS WITHOUT CASES: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF ADVISORY 
OPINIONS 45–47, 58–59 (2019). 
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applied to the secession of the province of Quebec from Canada, such that 
for secession to be lawful, a constitutional amendment would be required.3 
More recently, in the Senate Reform Reference, the Court had to determine 
whether proposed legislative measures to alter aspects of the upper house 
of the Parliament of Canada were in fact constitutional amendments going 
to the fundamental features and institutional design of the Senate, and thus 
subject to the Constitution’s complex and stringent multilateral 
procedures.4  
I appeared before the Supreme Court as one of counsel in each of these 
references. It should come as no surprise, then, that Richard Kay’s writings 
have often been much on my mind when it comes to the theory and 
practice of constitutional law in Canada, and the elucidation of ideas and 
principles associated with constitutionalism and the rule of law in liberal 
democratic federations like ours. 
I. CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES: POINTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE 
The constitutional frameworks and legal systems of Canada and the 
United States share much in their design and traditions. We both have a 
British common-law constitutional heritage that we like to trace back 
romantically to the English Bill of Rights of 1689 or indeed, the Magna 
Carta of 1215. We each possess a written document—or in in the 
Canadian case, a compendious list of Acts and instruments—declared by 
the Constitution itself to be the “supreme law” of the land, with a federal 
division of legislative powers between central and local legislatures, an 
entrenched bill of rights, and express legal procedures for constitutional 
amendment. Americans have Article V of the Constitution of the United 
States; Canadians have Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982. The Acts of 
Congress and Parliament and of state and provincial legislatures are, 
generally speaking, subject to constitutional judicial review; the doctrine of 
the separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers (still, in some 
ways, an emerging doctrine in Canada) is also always in play. Moreover, 
generally speaking, with controversial and debatable exceptions, we share 
an abiding commitment to judicial independence and the rule of law. These 
are some, but by no means all, of the features common to our two 
constitutions.  
However, our countries are also constitutionally distinct in other 
important respects. Unlike the United States, which is a republic with a 
presidential and congressional system of government, Canada is a 
constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system of representative and 
                                                                                                                     
3 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 218 (Can.). 
4 Reference re Senate Reform, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 704, 709–10. 
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responsible government. Moreover, although the Dominion of Canada 
established in 1867 in what was then known as British North America has 
become as much a sovereign and independent state as the great republic 
whose independence was declared in 1776, Canada achieved its 
independence incrementally over a comparatively long period. This 
independence was legally accomplished through the Statute of 
Westminster, 1931 and the Canada Act 1982, statutes enacted originally by 
the United Kingdom Parliament, but which are now part of the law of the 
Constitution of Canada in a domestic and internal sense.5 
II. NO PREDOMINANT REVOLUTIONARY TRADITION IN CANADIAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE OR JURISPRUDENCE 
A corollary to this is that Canada has had no revolutionary act or 
moment at the core of its founding, and thus no strong revolutionary 
tradition or predominant current in its constitutional discourse and legal 
theory. It is a truism oft repeated that Canadians and Canadian political 
institutions favor, in the main, evolution over revolution. American 
constitutional thinkers, on the other hand, have had to explain the 
Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and 
ultimately, the establishment of the Constitution of the United States in 
ways which plausibly and coherently account for the break with the old 
legal order and which celebrate the undoubted virtues of new beginnings 
and new constitutional moments.  
Many American scholars perhaps naturally tend to see legal (and 
illegal) revolutions occurring where most of their Canadian counterparts 
will only want to sustain, where possible, legal stability and continuity. 
This is probably, of course, a gross generalization, but it is put this way to 
make an important point. Canadian constitutionalism, particularly legal 
constitutionalism, abhors revolution as a means by which to achieve 
fundamental political change. This is not to deny the existence or current 
legitimacy of many states that have achieved their sovereignty through 
unilateral declarations of independence and similar forms of regime change 
resulting in legal discontinuity, but it is to affirm that this has not been the 
Canadian tradition. 
Constitutional Law Professor Emeritus Stephen Scott of McGill 
University, in his written brief to the Supreme Court in the aforementioned 
Manitoba Language Rights Reference, put it eloquently in dealing with the 
potential resort, in that instance, to doctrines such as state necessity and the 
resort to de facto authority (notably as invoked in some of the American 
civil war cases): 
                                                                                                                     
5 Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 Geo. V c. 4 (UK); Canada Act 1982, c. 11 (UK), reprinted in 
R.S.C. 1985 (Can.); Constitution Act, 1867, c. 3 (UK), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985 (Can.). 
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Anglo-Canadian public law is deeply legitimist—which is 
another way of saying, deeply committed to 
constitutionalism.  Law must be made according to law—and 
not otherwise . . . . 
Doctrines of state necessity, public convenience, and de facto 
authority are means of escape from the discipline of the 
principles of legality. They are confessions of the failure of 
the legal system, not marks of its success . . . . They carry 
temptations for the political authorities, and correlative 
dangers for the legal system and the rule of law. They must 
not be the first resort, but the last; and then only to the extent 
strictly necessary.6 
Professor Scott continued inexorably in his argument towards a 
broader, but equally profound, observation: 
Nor should every substantial illegality be excused on the 
basis that a revolution has occurred, and a legal order 
commenced, whereunder the Court is acting. Rather the 
Courts must maintain the continuity of the legal order from 
the earliest possible date. Every fundamental legal 
discontinuity—every new revolutionary commencement—
represents a successful and profound attack on 
constitutionalism itself, and a trauma for the legal system.7 
In the Manitoba Language Rights Reference, the Supreme Court did 
not shrink from the consequences of its decision to invalidate ninety years 
of Manitoba laws for want of compliance with the manner-and-form 
requirements of law-making prescribed by the Constitution of Canada.8 
The unconstitutional statutes were declared to be “of no force or effect” 
pursuant to section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870 and the supremacy clause 
in section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.9 That declaration was 
consistent with the principles of constitutionalism and the rule of law. 
However, “because of the Manitoba Legislature’s persistent violation of 
the constitutional dictates of the Manitoba Act, 1870,” the Province of 
Manitoba was, the Court also recognized, “in a state of emergency.”10 The 
Court canvassed analogous cases on state necessity but was careful to 
further the application of the principle of the rule of law in deeming 
                                                                                                                     
6 Stephen A. Scott, factum filed on behalf of Alliance Québec, in the Supreme Court of Canada, 
on May 25, 1984, in Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 (emphasis in 
original paras. 48, 57) (parenthetical numbering of points internal to para. 57 removed). 
7 Id. para. 61. 
8 Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 723. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 766. 
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Manitoba laws valid and effective for the “minimum period of time 
necessary for translation, re-enactment, printing and publishing of these 
laws.”11 
In the Quebec Secession Reference, the Supreme Court noted that the 
Constitution Act, 1867’s mention, in its preamble, of Canada having “a 
Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom” had 
emphasized “the continuity of constitutional principles, including 
democratic institutions and the rule of law; and the continuity of the 
exercise of sovereign power transferred from Westminster to the federal 
and provincial capitals of Canada.”12 The Court went on to observe that 
“Canada’s evolution from colony to fully independent state was gradual” 
and that “Canada’s independence from Britain was achieved through legal 
and political evolution with an adherence to the rule of law and stability.”13 
The Statute of Westminster, 1931, had “confirmed in law what had earlier 
been confirmed in fact by the Balfour Declaration of 1926, namely, that 
Canada was an independent country.”14 The proclamation of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 had “removed the last vestige of British authority 
over the Canadian Constitution”: 
Legal continuity, which requires an orderly transfer of 
authority, necessitated that the 1982 amendments be made by 
the Westminster Parliament, but the legitimacy as 
distinguished from the formal legality of the amendments 
derived from political decisions taken in Canada within a 
legal framework which this Court, in the Patriation 
Reference, had ruled was in accordance with our 
Constitution.15 
In the Secession Reference, the Supreme Court refused to entertain 
arguments proffered by certain academics at the time that the secession of 
a province of Canada would be beyond the contemplation of the existing 
constitutional order and thus would be an entirely political and extralegal, 
or supraconstitutional, phenomenon. Rather, the Court held that although 
the Constitution’s amending procedures were silent on the subject of 
secession, that did not mean that the legal aspects of secession were 
beyond their reach.16 “Secession,” the Court stated, “is a legal act as much 
                                                                                                                     
11 Id. at 768. 
12 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 245, para. 44 (Can.). 
13 Id. at 246, para. 46.  
14 Id.  
15 Id. at 246–47, paras. 46–48 (“We think it apparent from even this brief historical review that 
the evolution of our constitutional arrangements has been characterized by adherence to the rule of law, 
respect for democratic institutions, the accommodation of minorities, insistence that governments 
adhere to constitutional conduct and a desire for continuity and stability.”). 
16 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. at 235. 
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as a political one,” and “the legality of unilateral secession must be 
evaluated, at least in the first instance, from the perspective of the domestic 
legal order of the state from which the unit seeks to withdraw.”17 “The 
secession of a province from Canada,” the Court held, “must be 
considered, in legal terms, to require an amendment to the Constitution,” 
because “an act of secession would purport to alter the governance of 
Canadian territory in a manner which undoubtedly is inconsistent with our 
current constitutional arrangements.”18 The fact that the changes would be 
“profound,” and potentially “radical and extensive,” did “not negate their 
nature as amendments to the Constitution of Canada.”19  
The Supreme Court also rejected the idea of a constitutional principle 
of effectivity, akin to the doctrine of necessity, which had been urged upon 
it by the amicus curiae in the Reference.   
In our view, the alleged principle of effectivity has no 
constitutional or legal status in the sense that it does not 
provide an ex ante explanation or justification for an act. In 
essence, acceptance of a principle of effectivity would be 
tantamount to accepting that the National Assembly, 
legislature or government of Quebec may act without regard 
to the law, simply because it asserts the power to do so. So 
viewed, the suggestion is that the National Assembly, 
legislature or government of Quebec could purport to secede 
the province unilaterally from Canada in disregard of 
Canadian and international law. It is further suggested that if 
the secession bid was successful, a new legal order would be 
created in that province, which would then be considered an 
independent state. 
Such a proposition is an assertion of fact, not a statement of 
law. It may or may not be true; in any event, it is irrelevant to 
the questions of law before us. If, on the other hand, it is put 
forward as an assertion of law, then it simply amounts to the 
contention that the law may be broken as long as it can be 
broken successfully. Such a notion is contrary to the rule of 
law and must be rejected.20 
                                                                                                                     
17 Id. at 263, para. 83. 
18 Id. para. 84. 
19 Id. at 263–64, para. 84. For further discussion, see generally WARREN J. NEWMAN, THE 
QUEBEC SECESSION REFERENCE, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE POSITION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF CANADA (1999); Richard S. Kay, The Secession Reference and the Limits of Law, 10 OTAGO L. 
REV. 327, 327 (2003) (characterizing the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Secession 
Reference); Stéphane Dion, Secession and the Virtues of Clarity, 44 OTTAWA L. REV. 403, 405 (2012) 
(arguing the universality of the opinion on secession).   
20 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. at 275, paras. 107–108. 
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The idea that Canada’s procedures for constitutional amendment might 
contemplate the possibility of, and contain the means for, effecting the 
secession of a province from the Canadian federal state lawfully, through 
legal and properly enacted alterations to the Constitution of Canada itself, 
served as a way of channeling the political forces that were militating in 
favor of such radical changes through a constitutional framework and 
parameters. While ruling that a unilateral declaration of independence 
would be unlawful, the Supreme Court of Canada’s opinion in the 
Secession Reference carefully balanced considerations of legality and 
legitimacy, legal and political constitutionalism, democracy and the rule of 
law, and federalism and the protection of minorities21 in a way that made 
the lawful processes of the Constitution attractive to Canadian federalists 
and Quebec sovereigntists alike, insofar as both would have a stake in the 
proper workings of the Constitution and in principled discussions aimed at 
accomplishing constitutionally achievable ends. This may be contrasted in 
some measure with the American experience of the Civil War, the 
Confederacy of secessionist states, and the judgment of the Supreme Court 
of the United States in Texas v. White, in which the Court held that “[t]he 
Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, 
composed of indestructible States.”22             
III. RICHARD KAY’S CONSTITUTIONAL CHRONONOMY 
In his thoughtful paper, Constitutional Chrononomy, Professor Richard 
Kay wove together certain strands of his earlier writings on 
constitutionalism but with a particular focus on the temporal ambitions of 
constitution-making and the temporal limitations on constitutional 
life-spans.23 There is a low-key, patient, but clear and compelling (and in 
places, relentless and implacable) logic to most and perhaps all of 
Professor Kay’s essays, and Constitutional Chrononomy fits well within 
this pattern. The themes herein enunciated may be summarized and 
paraphrased in part as follows: the singular purpose of constitution-making 
is to control the future behavior of the state, by articulating, in advance, 
rules of state conduct which will minimize the extent to which the state 
interferes in the lives of its citizens.24 The constitution establishes (i.e., 
constitutes) institutions and sets out the procedures that must be followed 
to effect genuine and authentic (or authoritative) acts of government.25 The 
constitution also prohibits certain activities by government, and 
                                                                                                                     
21 See id. paras. 76–77 (discussing these balanced considerations). 
22 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868). 
23 See generally Richard S. Kay, Constitutional Chrononomy, 13 RATIO JURIS. 31 (2000).   
24 Id. at 31. 
25 Id. 
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occasionally, sets forth affirmative duties on government.26 These aim, 
through scriptural injunctions (“thou shalt” and “thou shalt not”), to 
confirm power within acceptable limits by requiring decisions to be taken 
with the concurrence of diverse interests.27 The sanction for not respecting 
the constitutional processes specified, or acting in conflict with the 
constitutional protections afforded or the stipulations prescribed, is that 
non-compliant government acts are generally treated as ineffective (or in 
the terms of section 52 of Canada’s Constitution Act, 1982, “of no force or 
effect”).28 Like that of all rules, the enactment of constitutional rules 
“supposes that future actors will understand them and heed them. Their 
success thus depends on an attitude that, by definition, respects the act of 
constitution-making, a particular historical event.”29  
There is, Professor Kay observed, “a chrononomic aspect to every 
constitution” that “marks out not merely a social, geographic and political 
space but also a limited interval in time.”30 The “linkage between 
constitutionalism and the passage of time” is threefold: (i) 
“constitution-making requires an acute awareness of the inevitably 
unpredictable course of future events”; (ii) “constitutional interpretation 
and application demands attention to that historical act of 
constitution-making”; and (iii) “the act of resisting and finally terminating 
the authority of a given constitution will involve a comparison between 
past beliefs, plans and aspirations embodied in the relevant constitution 
and those of the new society which it purports to govern.”31 The balance of 
his paper is devoted to these three features: “Looking Forward,” “Looking 
Back,” and “Temporal Dysfunction.”32  
In terms of looking ahead, Professor Kay’s leitmotif, so elegantly 
developed in his earlier essay, American Constitutionalism,33 is that “[t]he 
central social function of constitutions is the prevention of a proven 
danger—overreaching by the state.”34 Legal rules of institutional design, 
procedure, and substance are the machinery by which the exercise of the 
state’s powers are confined within predetermined and set limits, in keeping 
with the liberal view that “human thriving is most likely to be obtained in a 
life that is largely self-defined,”35 and that at least a minimum core of a 
priori rules that bind the state, either procedurally or in substance, allow 
                                                                                                                     
26 Id. at 32. 
27 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
28 Constitution Act, 1982, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app. II, no. 44, § 52(1) (Can.). 
29 Kay, supra note 23, at 32.   
30 Id. 
31 Id. (emphasis added). 
32 Id. at 33, 37, 41. 
33 Kay, supra note 1. 
34 Kay, supra note 23, at 33. 
35 Id. 
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for individual planning and personal autonomy in a private sphere or space 
that is reasonably secure from unwarranted, unannounced, and capricious 
intrusions by the state. On this basis, “constitutional rules must be 
relatively long lived” if constitutional protections are to be effective in 
making “individual planning possible.”36 Without the specification of “a 
more or less permanent set of rules of state conduct,” the “central feature 
of constitutionalism”—the ability “to predict what the state will and will 
not do in relation to the projected conduct of individuals”—will be 
“subverted if the constitution undergoes repeated changes”:  “there is an 
intrinsic incompatibility between constitutions and continuous 
constitutional revision.”37 
Professor Kay recognized, of course, that most constitution-makers, 
while motivated with the intention that the supreme rules they are drafting 
will likely operate well into an indefinite future, will also understand that a 
constitution, as a human and therefore perfectible instrument, cannot be 
entirely immutable, and thus will also make some provision for 
constitutional amendment.38 That amendment procedure will, however, (if 
properly designed) “take into account the need for long-term stability” and 
thus “make the successful adoption of amendments difficult.”39  
Constitutional drafters therefore “work on the assumption that the rules 
they establish will remain in place relatively unchanged for a long period 
of time,” that “frequent amendment cannot be expected” (nor would it be a 
good thing); and that “the world in which those rules will be applied will 
not stand still.”40 This desire for longevity in a changing world commends 
a prudential approach that narrows the range of matters subject to 
constitutional control, and avoids strictly defining or hedging in 
governmental powers “with limits so specific” as to disable effective 
government.41 Moreover, “[t]he promulgation of a constitution, being an 
event both important and infrequent, is generally thought to require an 
extraordinarily broad political consensus in order to invest it with that 
legitimacy which will allow it to function effectively over the long term.”42 
This long-term desideratum and the need for consensus will “move the 
constitution-makers to limit themselves” to imposing only those limitations 
and protections that are “believed essential for future safety.”43  
In terms of looking back, if constitution-makers must “speculate about 
the future” in which their provisions will be applied, then it follows, in 
                                                                                                                     
36 Id. 
37 Id.  
38 Id. 
39 Id.  
40 Id. at 34. 
41 Id. at 35. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 35–36.  
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Professor Kay’s view, that those who are subsequently subject to the 
constitution must look back to glean the framers’ intentions “in order to 
understand the content of constitutional limitations.”44 In this part of his 
paper, Professor Kay covered well-trodden ground, eschewing the 
living-tree approach (predominant in Canada)45 to constitutional 
interpretation as “in tension with a central aspect of the enterprise of 
constitutionalism.”46 Constitutions are designed to restrict state action by 
setting out “structures, procedures and substantive rules” with a view 
toward applying them into the future: “[t]his exercise is nothing if not a 
judgment that the constituent decisions” embodied in the supreme law of 
the constitution “are to be preferred to the subsequent official decisions” 
(particularly, one might add, when the latter are in conflict with the 
former).47 A constitution that is always being adapted through judicial 
interpretation to deal with current problems and needs is, in Professor 
Kay’s stark assessment, “no constitution at all.”48  
Professor Kay was only slightly more sanguine about the textualist 
approach to constitutional interpretation, insofar as it “defines somewhat 
stricter limits for interpretation than the more general ‘living constitution’ 
model. The words of the constitution themselves restrict the number of 
possible interpretations by limiting them to those consistent with the 
standard definitions of the words of the textual provision invoked.”49 
However, the textualist approach, being “another attempt to extirpate 
historical references from the process of constitutional application,” carries 
its own share of issues, including “problems that are especially 
troublesome for the idea of a constitution as an a priori and relatively 
stable set of rules for public action.”50 To the extent that textualism permits 
the possibility of more than one meaning of the constitutional text, it 
renders the constitution’s meaning “intrinsically uncertain,” which limits 
its capacity to draw with assurance the limits of state intrusion and “the 
boundaries of undisturbed private conduct.”51 As well, in Professor Kay’s 
view, “the refusal to inquire into the specific meaning attached to a 
constitutional rule by its enactors undercuts the claim of the constitution to 
be regarded as authoritative.”52 The normative force of constitutions is at 
                                                                                                                     
44 Id. at 37. 
45 Warren J. Newman, Of Castles and Living Trees: The Metaphorical and Structural 
Constitution, 9 J. PARLIAMENTARY & POL. L. 471, 471–97 (2015) (exploring some competing 
structural and animating metaphors of constitutionalism).  
46 Kay, supra note 23, at 38. 
47 Id.  
48 Id. 
49 Id.  
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 38–39. 
52 Id. at 39. 
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least in part made possible by “appeals to the solemn decision of ‘the 
people’ in creating them,” such that the constitution’s legitimacy cannot be 
“divorced from its historical origins,” and the idea that “it is the product of 
some shared purpose amongst a group of people” who for that 
constitutional moment and into the future were believed to be “the right 
people to make fundamental decisions for a polity.”53       
So far, this analytical discourse is unsurprising and largely 
uncontroversial, for those who have read Professor Kay’s American 
Constitutionalism and similar writings, and the propositions are put with 
his usual elegant flair. However, it is the final part of the paper, dealing 
with “Temporal Dysfunction,” which gives this Canadian constitutional 
lawyer some pause; not so much in the diagnostic, but in the remedy. 
Professor Kay contended that if, as discussed, “the great ambition of 
constitution-makers is to bind the future to the values of the present,” then 
“the great problem for this enterprise is the inability to predict with 
confidence how the future will look and how human beings whose actions 
are to be controlled will respond in that unpredictable time to come.”54 
Techniques, both in the drafting and in the interpretation of constitutions, 
have been noted to mediate the issue and mitigate its effects. Yet “sooner 
or later every constitution will begin to chafe,” and it is “inevitable that 
urgent needs or intolerable evils will appear that were simply 
unforeseeable at the time of constitution-making.”55 The “ordering of 
social values that informed the initial constitutional decisions may shift 
significantly,” and there “will then develop a misalignment between the 
constitution and the social and political realities” now obtaining.56   
Of course, constitutional misalignment may be corrected, to some 
degree, through constitutional amendment and judicial interpretation. But 
in many cases, the natural tendency will be to “do nothing” and to tolerate, 
to the extent possible, the increasing anomalies caused by the “lack of fit” 
between the “now obsolete constitutional text” and “important social 
factors” rather than “undertak[ing] the difficult and traumatic process of 
full-blown constitutional replacement.”57      
Professor Kay continued by noting that “[a]lthough every constitution 
exhibits an increasingly poor fit with contemporary facts and values, such 
constitutions will be tolerated until some issue arises the importance of 
which justifies an explicit re-examination.”58 He gave the example of 
Canada’s Constitution as exhibiting a significant and persistent 
                                                                                                                     
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 41. 
55 Id.  
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 42. 
58 Id. 
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misalignment in that, while Canada had become a sovereign state, its 
formal constitutional amendment process continued to lie with the United 
Kingdom Parliament.59 This occasioned only “minor inconvenience” until 
1982, when the then-federal government sought to “exploit the formal but 
outdated rules to effect a substantial and concrete change.”60 For Canada, 
“a change in the constitutional amendment rules emerged only after the 
federal government, contrary to long-standing practice, attempted to secure 
a new amendment procedure and an entrenched Bill of Rights, by 
requesting an act of the United Kingdom Parliament without obtaining 
agreement from provincial governments.”61 However, I would add that 
ultimately, constitutional change was effected legally, and in accordance 
with the constitutional conventions that had developed through past 
practices. There was a strain on the constitutional system, particularly with 
respect to Quebec, but there was no revolutionary break with the old 
order.62 As the Supreme Court of Canada observed: “The Constitution Act, 
1982 is now in force.  Its legality is neither challenged nor assailable.”63 
Professor Kay made a good point when he observed that although 
“every modern constitution provides machinery for its own amendment,” a 
constitution “must provide some minimal amount of stability and 
predictability,” and thus, in this respect, “the amendment procedures must 
be designed to frustrate frequent change.”64 He then asked rhetorically: 
“What happens when an unchanged—and practically unchangeable—
constitution becomes politically unacceptable?”65 
Judicial refitting of the constitution to current need through a process 
of progressive interpretation—the “living tree” approach—if it takes the 
constitution beyond the “categories created by the original enactors,” must, 
in Professor Kay’s view, “amount to an irregular amendment of the 
constitution by its interpreters.”66 While judicial construction of this kind 
“may successfully realign the constitution,” it will also be “subversive of 
constitutionalism” by increasing legal uncertainty as to what the 
constitutional rules are, thereby undermining the security one seeks in 
                                                                                                                     
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 42–43. 
62 It is true that the Committee on the Constitution of the Canadian Bar Association, in its report, 
Towards a New Canada, published in 1978, did recommend the “dramatic gesture” of a unilateral 
declaration of independence in proclaiming a new Canadian constitution; it is a testament to the 
sagacity and prudence of the Canadian political leaders of the day that they emphatically chose the path 
of legality, through a final enactment of the United Kingdom Parliament, instead. COMM. ON THE 
CONSTITUTION, CANADIAN BAR ASS’N, TOWARDS A NEW CANADA 6 (1978). 
63 Re: Objection by Quebec to a Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793, 806 
(Can.).  
64 Kay, supra note 23, at 43. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 44. 
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establishing a constitution.67 Kay gave the example of the American 
Constitution as one that has been substantially changed through the course 
of litigation and judicial interpretation, which has “significantly reduced . . 
. the settling and securing functions of the constitution.”68  
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE 
However, having regard to the limitations inherent in both the formal 
constitutional amendment and judicial interpretation processes, Professor 
Kay posited that “[a]t some point the constitution becomes incorrigibly 
unsuitable for the polity it is meant to govern. At this point the only avenue 
open for dealing with the problem is an explicit departure from law the old 
constitution has established.”69 This, to a Canadian jurist, is like saying 
that sooner or later an asteroid will hit the earth and destroy all forms of 
higher life. 
Professor Kay hastened to add that “[t]his kind of constitutional 
change need not be violent or even particularly disruptive. What it requires 
is that there be a palpable departure from the authority of the existing 
constitution.”70 A well-known illustration was the departure from the 
Articles of Confederation and the enactment of the Constitution of the 
United States between 1787 and 1789, which was accomplished “through 
peaceful, although unauthorized, procedures.”71 
Indeed, he went on to contend that there are “advantages to changing 
constitutions through overtly illegal means.”72 The new constitutional and 
legal order would, Kay suggested, “be able to draw legitimacy from the 
events of the change.”73 That, of course, is true only if the founders of the 
new order are generally perceived, I would note, as acting legitimately in 
overthrowing the existing legal regime, and are not considered to be 
revolutionary usurpers, acting without legal authority to impose their will 
by force. 
Professor Kay argued as well that “[t]he quality of the constitutional 
rules created may also be compromised by failing to acknowledge the 
break in legal continuity.”74 It will be harder to meet “special needs” of 
constitutional lawmaking “if the process is disguised as mere 
subconstitutional change.”75 A “transparently illegal action allows 
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68 Id. at 45. 
69 Id. (emphasis added). 
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71 Id. at 45–46. 
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subsequent interpreters of the new constitutional rules to place them in the 
true context of their creation.”76 Attempting to reconcile those rules with 
the pre-existing constitutional authority may obscure their meaning and 
thereby undermine “the constitutionalist desiderata of stability and 
clarity.”77 Yet to this, I must add, as a plaintive aside, what about the 
constitutionalist desiderata of maintaining the rule of law? 
Professor Kay did allow that where “substantial elements in a society 
[] remain committed to the prior constitutional regime . . . only a contest of 
force can effect the necessary constitutional change.”78 Professor Kay 
further acknowledged that “[w]hen the resistance comes from the official 
holders of power, the result is a revolution. A successful revolution is the 
clearest possible indication that time has made the existing constitution 
unsuitable.”79   
Kay then made another key observation: “It is remarkable, however, 
how often genuine revolutionaries seek to connect their actions in one way 
or the other to the artifacts of the legal system they are displacing,”80 
pointing to the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 in England81 and to the 
declarations of the President of the unilaterally seceding states in the 
Confederacy.82 
The same point could have been made with regard to the Draft Bill on 
the Sovereignty of Quebec which was introduced in the National Assembly 
in December 1994, and which contained within it the terms of a unilateral 
declaration of independence.83 As I wrote some years ago:  
What it portended was nothing less than a revolution, an 
overthrow of the established legal order of Canada. But it 
was a revolution that dared not speak its name. The 
“Declaration of Sovereignty” was to be clothed in statutory 
form, and on its face the Act would promise continuity, not 
chaos. However, by an artful sleight of hand, the legislature 
of the province of Quebec, which exercises its powers under 
the Constitution of Canada, would be replaced by the 






81 Professor Kay subsequently wrote his eloquent masterwork on this question. See RICHARD S. 
KAY, THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION AND THE CONTINUITY OF LAW 2 (2014) (“[T]he need to 
accommodate the law was not a mere irritant. It was a powerful constraint on what the revolutionaries 
did and, certainly, on what they said. The pull of legality and the shame of illegality were continuous, 
insistent, and intense.”).  
82 Kay, supra note 23, at 47. 
83 Draft Bill, An Act respecting the Sovereignty of Québec, Quebec Nat’l Assemb., 1st Sess., 35th 
Leg. (1994). 
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National Assembly of the independent state of Quebec, 
exercising powers under the new régime purportedly 
established by the sovereignty legislation itself.84 
As Professor Kay finally conceded, “The same craving for stability 
that animates constitutionalism may make the appearance of some form of 
legal continuity essential to generate the political acceptability even of 
revolutionary change.”85  
V. CONSTITUTIONAL CHRONOMETRY AND THE FUTURE REACH OF 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
All in all, the thesis mooted in Constitutional Chrononomy strikes me 
(and with the greatest of respect for its author) as somewhat of an exercise 
in armchair philosophy. Revolutionary breaks with existing constitutional 
and legal orders are not the inevitable outcomes of anachronistic 
constitutions, however much revolutionaries may attempt to justify their 
actions ex post facto in that light. If revolutions do occur and liberal 
constitutions are overthrown, it will not be because the constitutions 
themselves are out of date, but because the commitment to 
constitutionalism itself has been abandoned.      
Indeed, as the tenets of modern constitutionalism continue to develop, 
it appears to this Canadian participant that a convergence on basic 
constitutional norms and constitutions is occurring. The importance to all 
modern states of the rule of law, the separation of powers, judicial 
independence, democratic and representative political institutions, free and 
fair elections, the protection of minorities, and fundamental rights cannot 
be gainsaid. Legal continuity is a corollary, and stability a desirable effect, 
of the maintenance of the rule of law. American comparativists, such as 
Richard Kay, Mark Tushnet, Vicki Jackson, Mark Graber, Bruce 
Ackerman, and the late Norman Dorsen, have worked hard to ensure that 
the great ideas and enterprise of constitutionalism are perpetuated, not 
upended and replaced. The opening words of Professor Kay’s chapter on 
“American Constitutionalism” carry this normative message forward in 
clear, matter-of-fact, and eloquent terms: 
As the twentieth century comes to a close, the triumph of 
constitutionalism appears almost complete. Just about every 
state in the world has a written constitution. The great 
majority of these declare the constitution to be law 
controlling the organs of the state. And, in at least many 
                                                                                                                     
84 W.J. NEWMAN, THE QUEBEC SECESSION REFERENCE: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE POSITION OF 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA 7 (1999). 
85 Kay, supra note 23, at 46. 
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states, that constitution is, in fact, successfully invoked by 
courts holding acts of the state invalid because inconsistent 
with the constitution. This development is generally thought 
to be a tribute to an especially American idea. Although there 
is considerable variation in the substantive contents and 
structural machinery of constitutionalism in various 
countries, the central idea, forged in the American founding, 
of public power controlled by the enforcement of a superior 
law is present everywhere constitutional government is 
proclaimed.86 
The events of the first two decades of the twenty-first century might 
suggest to some, both cynics and idealists alike, that the words above were 
reflective only of hubris, and that in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and the 
Americas, the ideas, tenets, and values of constitutionalism are being 
threatened, rolled back, or are otherwise under siege.   
That said, the normative potential and influence of the discipline of 
comparative constitutional law is greater than ever before. This is due, in 
the main, to the exponential availability and distribution of constitutional 
texts, doctrine, and jurisprudence, through the Internet and other modes of 
instantaneous electronic communication; the burgeoning initiatives of the 
academy such as the I-CONnect Blog;87 the reports and opinions of 
academic or expert advisory bodies such as the Bingham Centre for the 
Rule of Law;88 the Constitution Unit at University College London;89 the 
European Commission on Democracy through Law90 (the Venice 
                                                                                                                     
86 Kay, supra note 1, at 16 (citations omitted). 
87 See Tom Ginsburg, Welcome Message from Tom Ginsberg, I-CONNECT: INT’L J. CONST. L. 
BLOG, http://www.iconnectblog.com/welcome-message-from-tom-ginsburg/ (last visited Feb. 13, 
2020) (“Our goals, succinctly, are several. We want a place for real-time updates on important new 
constitutional cases, amendments, constitution-making efforts and other new developments. We hope 
to also provide a forum for thoughtful analysis of major issues in the field of comparative constitutional 
law.”). 
88 See Mission and Strategic Aims, BINGHAM CTR. FOR RULE L., 
https://binghamcentre.biicl.org/mission-strategicaims (last visited Feb. 13, 2020) (“Our mission is 
simple: to advance the Rule of Law worldwide.”). 
89 See About Us, CONSTITUTION UNIT UCL, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/about-
constitution-unit/about-us (last visited Feb. 13, 2020) (“The Constitution Unit conducts timely, 
rigorous, independent research into constitutional change and the reform of political institutions. Our 
research has significant real-world impact, informing policy-makers engaged in such changes - both in 
the United Kingdom and around the world.”). 
90 See For Democracy Through Law, VENICE COMMISSION ON COUNCIL EUR., 
https://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_Presentation&lang=EN (last visited Feb. 13, 
2020) (“The role of the Venice Commission is to provide legal advice to its member states and, in 
particular, to help states wishing to bring their legal and institutional structures into line with European 
standards and international experience in the fields of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It 
also helps to ensure the dissemination and consolidation of a common constitutional heritage . . . .”). 
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Commission, celebrating its 30th anniversary this year);91 the World 
Conference on Constitutional Justice;92 the Global Network on Electoral 
Justice;93 comparative documents such as the Commonwealth Principles on 
the Three Branches of Government;94 the Venice Commission’s Rule of 
Law Checklist;95 and more.96 
We must continue to harness this theoretical and practical work, to 
participate in these academic and institutional fora, to nourish and sustain 
our belief and trust in constitutionalism as a means to establish a priori 
limits on the exercise of state powers, to encourage public actors to stay 
within those limits, and thus to guarantee us all a margin of safety, 
                                                                                                                     
91 Id. 
92 See World Conference on Constitutional Justice — 117 Members!, VENICE COMMISSION ON 
COUNCIL EUR., https://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=02_WCCJ (last visited Feb. 13, 2020) 
(“The World Conference on Constitutional Justice unites 117 Constitutional Courts and Councils and 
Supreme Courts in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Australia/Oceania and Europe. It promotes 
constitutional justice – understood as constitutional review including human rights case-law – as a key 
element for democracy, the protection of human rights and the rule of law . . . .”). 
93 See GLOB. NETWORK ON ELECTORAL JUSTICE, CONSTITUTIVE ACT 1, 
https://www.te.gob.mx/red_mundial/media/pdf/d1986e1d9e6a084.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2020) 
(“The Global Network on Electoral Justice will pursue the following objectives: First. Facilitate the 
exchange of judicial-electoral information and the cooperation between members and associates of the 
Network. Second. Identify and exchange best practices for the advancement of Tribunals, Courts, and 
Judicial Electoral Bodies worldwide.”). 
94 See COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT ET AL., COMMONWEALTH (LATIMER HOUSE) PRINCIPLES 
ON THE THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT 10 (2009), http://www.cpahq.org/cpahq/cpadocs/ 
Commonwealth%20Latimer%20Principles%20web%20version.pdf  (“The objective of these Principles 
is to provide, in accordance with the laws and customs of each Commonwealth country, an effective 
framework for the implementation by governments, parliaments and judiciaries of the 
Commonwealth’s fundamental values.”). 
95 VENICE COMM’N, RULE OF LAW CHECKLIST 12 (2016), https://www.venice.coe.int/images/ 
SITE%20IMAGES/Publications/Rule_of_Law_Check_List.pdf (“The present checklist is intended to 
build on these developments and to provide a tool for assessing the Rule of Law in a given country 
from the view point of its constitutional and legal structures, the legislation in force and the existing 
case-law. The checklist aims at enabling an objective, thorough, transparent and equal assessment.”). 
96 To this list one might add the Clough Centre for the Study of Constitutional Democracy at 
Boston College, the Centre for Constitutional Studies at the University of Alberta, the Public Law 
Centre of the University of Ottawa, and many more such bodies. See Vlad Perju, From the Director, 
BOS. C.: CLOUGH CTR. FOR STUDY CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, https://www.bc.edu/content/bc-
web/centers/clough/about.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2020) (“The Center strives to reinvigorate and 
reimagine the study of constitutional democracy in the twenty-first century. By taking a holistic, global, 
and interdisciplinary approach to constitutional democracy, we seek to foster original research and 
thoughtful reflection on the promise and challenges of constitutional government in the United States 
and around the world.”); About Us, U. ALBERTA: CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL STUD., 
https://ualawccsprod.srv.ualberta.ca/index.php/about-us (last visited Feb. 13, 2020) (“The Centre for 
Constitutional Studies is a hub for constitutional research and public education in Canada. It connects 
leading Canadian and international scholars, contributes to constitutional debate, and creates resources 
that educate the public about the Constitution.”); Public Law at uOttawa, U. OTTAWA: UOTTAWA PUB. 
L. CTR., https://commonlaw.uottawa.ca/en/focus-areas/public-law (last visited Feb. 13, 2020) (“The 
uOttawa Public Law Centre is Canada’s leading centre for public law research, debate and engagement 
. . . . The Centre supports and carries out innovative and interdisciplinary research, which it 
disseminates to diverse audiences in Canada and globally.”). 
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autonomy, and self-realization. In doing so, we will also preserve the true 
constitutional and intellectual legacy of Professor Kay. 
 
